In reading Cornelissen’s chapters on issues management and
crisis communication, I looked for connections between both areas. His approach
seems to focus on defensive actions companies can take, whether proactively or
reactively. As a result, I don’t see as full of a discussion of transgressions
(206) as they deserve. How does a company environmentally scan for harmful
actions it may take? Cornelissen writes mostly from the viewpoint of how
companies can identify and swat those pesky stakeholders who might oppose
corporate policies.
I wondered how a crisis like General Motors’ ignition
switch scandal, in which a known defect lead to over 100 deaths, could have
been scanned for. Does a decade-long cover-up fall into either DESTEP or SWOT
scans (183-4)? It is strictly technological, and is certainly a weakness, but
probably not in the ways Cornelissen defines those terms. The fact is, this is
a crisis that born of a very poor response to another crisis, which was simply
a result of poor engineering and management.
I’m surprised at how matter-of-factly Cornelissen presents
denial, excuses, and attack and intimidation as legitimate strategies to
respond to a crisis (208). Yes, companies can and do respond in those ways, but
surely we should consider them unfortunate exceptions. Cornelissen devotes
nearly three full pages to Tata’s response to a terrorist attack, a crisis it
had no part in causing (211-3). He gives two thirds of a page to the Maclaren
pushchair scandal, a product defect causing serious harm (203). He focuses this
case study on lamenting the impact to the company’s reputation for a defect
that was known about for 10 years.
I’m trying to connect this discussion to the previous
chapter on employee communication. Yes, companies should have contingency plans
on how to communicate externally during a crisis. But surely the biggest
takeaway from a transgression is to improve internal communication. I think
these crises, which are not uncommon, deserve a richer discussion. Reputation
is important, but defensive responses won’t prevent the same issues from
re-occurring.
Cornelissen, J. (2014). Corporate Communication: A
Guide to Theory & Practice (4th ed.). London: SAGE.
You make some very interesting points. I am most interested in your comments about internal vs. external communication. I don't think the chapters differentiated these issues clearly. In my post, I looked at the Conagra drama unfolding in Omaha, Samantha talked about VW and you General Motors-- the communication strategies in each of these would be so different for the employee stakeholders vs. investors or customers. It is interesting to see that the Conagra employees are not offering "on the record" interviews but are offering some info to the press. More bad will comes from this uncertainty. Timing seems particularly important to consider as well. I guess I have more questions than answers.
ReplyDeleteYou make a great point about how improved employee communication could (and should) prevent these crises and issues from happening. I can understand using issue management and crisis communication strategies in the circumstance of an unforeseeable crisis. For example, the way Tylenol responded when someone laced its capsules with cyanide. The company could not have predicted that would happen, but they made the necessary changes to their capsules and packaging to prevent something similar from happening again. However, so many examples in Chapters 10 and 11 involve companies that are aware of their irresponsible or unethical behavior and choose not to address it until their wrongdoing is exposed. Unfortunately, this implies that most companies would rather handle crises than use effective communication to prevent crises from happening in the first place.
ReplyDeleteI love your line that the GM was crisis "born of a very poor response to another crisis." I also agree with your taking issue with Cornelissen's matter-of-fact tone in discussing what I consider execrable strategies of crisis management. Again I am left wanting more discussion of how organizations make missteps in their strategies. As for GM, I am shocked at their responses given what a common cliche "The cover up is worse than the crime" is.
ReplyDeleteYou're absolutely correct Neil when you say that "from the viewpoint of how companies can identify and swat those pesky stakeholders who might oppose corporate policies." Again I wonder if this is the result of the textbook medium and its inherent passivity. Reactions to crises is always about money. In the 1970s, Ford estimated that it would be cheaper to pay off the people who were affected by the pin in the gas tank that caused explosions than it would be to recall all those Pintos. It's always about money.
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